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"A GOOD STORY" AND "THE REAL STORY"
JANE

E. LARSON*

INTRODUCTION

[A] true lawyer hates facts. A lawyer is like an actor who can never
bother about what sort of play he appears in, but tells himself some
little story to cover as many of the incidents as he can be bothered to
remember. The only thing he hates is to be reminded-for instance
by the author-whatthe real story is about.'
This article will address several points Professor Baron has
made and elaborate on them,2 returning periodically to Frank
O'Connor's provocative observation about lawyers, facts and
stories. Baron makes three points that this article will connect to
the role of stories in lawyering, and thus to the teaching of legal
skills. Her aspiration is that law better reflect women's lived
experiences. 3 This article will argue that this requires knowledge
about the powerful and often volatile messages about gender that
are incorporated into many stories lawyers tell, meaning that
effective teaching of lawyering skills requires feminist insight.
First, Baron observes that although it is liberating to
recognize many oppressive aspects of the gender difference as
social constructions (and hence within the realm of human choice
and change),4 we chafe at the constricting power of those social
constructions. Against such social constructions we contrast the
richness and texture of what O'Connor calls the "real story," such
as the complex understandings that Tom has of his wife, Nellie,
and of their marriage.' If it is true that social constructions of
gender do not capture "the real story," can we discard them? This
article will argue that we cannot. Stories are fundamental to
human cognition and judgment.
Second, Baron observes that we tend to draw a boundary
Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School.
1. Frank O'Connor, Counsel for Oedipus, in LAW IN LITERATURE: LEGAL
THEMES IN SHORT STORIES 442, 444 (Elizabeth Villers Gemmette ed., 1992).
2. Jane B. Baron, Language Matters, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 163, 164
*

(2000).
3. Id. at 166.
4. Id. at 170.
5. Id.
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between law and life, and assign stories, with all their richness, to
life and not law.' O'Connor typifies this perspective, going so far
as to claim that "a true lawyer hates facts'"-and, by extension, the
"real stories" those facts tell.7 Baron is skeptical, commenting that
"[o]ne may need to consider whether the categories 'law' and
'ordinary life' are not two ways of describing a single set of
experiences, rather than two altogether separate categories.." If
stories are indispensable in life, Baron's point suggests they are
also indispensable to law. The conventional view is that legal
truthfinding aspires to a higher rationality than that attained by
knowing, understanding and judging in ordinary life. 9 Yet social
scientists tell us that stories are psychologically necessary for jury
decisionmaking, the very instrument of legal fact-finding: "The
acceptance of a story and reaching of a verdict seem to be the same
human act."'0 If so, then the teaching of legal skills must be the
teaching of storytelling.
Finally, Baron suggests that reductive, slanderous, and
injurious stories (which, on some readings, describes both her
examples of O'Connor's short story, Counsel for Oedipus and the
popular film, Notting Hill)" can only be countered with more and
other stories." "It seems to me more accurate and more sensible,"
she writes, "to understand the projects of legal feminism and of the
law and literature movement as reflecting a belief that law can
better reflect lived experiences-especially the experiences of
women-or at least reflect the multiple ways in which those
experiences might be described."" She suggests lawyering skills
teachers should "compare legal and nonlegal depictions of events,
to tell stories, and to read literature." 4
On this final point, I want to talk at a practical level about
constructing competing stories. Much of feminist theory concerns
6 Id. at 175, 178.
7. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 444.
8. Baron, supra note 2, at 179.

9. Robert Burns calls this "the Received View," by which the jury builds up
a value-free account of "what happened" out of purely empirical
generalizations and operations that can be called "logical." Robert P. Burns,
Some Realism (andIdealism) About the Trial, 31 GA. L. REV. 715 n.47 (1997).
See also William Twining, NarrativeAnd Generalizationsin Argumentation
About Questions of Fact, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 351, 356 (1999) (discussing the
idea that jury use of narrative strategies in decision making is "potentially
subversive of orthodox rationalist conceptions of fact determination.")
10. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror
Decision-Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 535 (1991). For

the development of the social science evidence, see infra note 25.
11. See generally O'Connor, supra note 1; NOTTING HILL (Universal

Studios, Inc. 1999).
12. Baron, supra note 2, at 175.

13. Id. at 177.
14. Id.
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resistance to cultural stereotypes. Within the law, a generation of
rape reform activism, for example, focused on ways in which
myths and stereotypes "blamed" victims for sexual assault,
denying them justice. 5 It may be true, as O'Connor reminds us,
that stories in courtrooms and the "real story". are not the same. 6
However, this reminder offers little guidance for effective
lawyering or for better reflecting the lived experiences of women in
lawyers' work. It is not enough that the "real story" we aspire to
tell about women's experiences be true; it must also be a "good
story" in the sense of being compelling and persuasive. I frame this
discussion with a story of my own, recounting the work of a lawyer
litigating a sexual tort case, a potentially transformative area of
tort law 7 whose litigation nonetheless remains mired in regressive
stories.
I.

STORIES AND LEGAL PROCESS

Professor Baron observes that lawyers often use "stock stories
both in order to telegraph information there is no time to put
directly into evidence and to invoke appealing, positive images."'
For his part, O'Connor describes lawyers as being "like an actor
who can never bother about what sort of play he appears in, but
tells himself some little story to cover as many of the incidents as
he can be bothered to remember." 9 It is not just that these
observations are true, but that they are true about people
generally and not just lawyers.2 ° Powerful evidence exists from
social psychologists that stories, including those we call
stereotypes, are a fundamental mechanism of human cognition.2'
The use of narratives to simplify, organize, and interpret our
sensory perceptions is not a failure of human reason, it is human
reason.
By contrast, the orthodox model of legal reasoning is drawn

15. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, PatriarchalStories I: CulturalRape
Narrativesin The Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387 (1996);
Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a
FairTrial in Rape Prosecutions,24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1027-31, 1040-57
(1991).
16. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 444.
17. On the argument for transformative possibility, see generally Jane E.
Larson, Women UnderstandSo Little, They Call My Good Nature Deceit: A
Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1993) [hereinafter
Larson, Seduction]; Jane E. Larson, Imagine Her Satisfaction: The
Transformative Task of Feminist Tort Work, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 56 (1993).
18. Baron, supra note 2, at 175.
19. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 397.
20. See Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984)
(discussing the idea that professional and lay lawyering can be meaningfully
described as storytelling).
21 See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:181

from the physical sciences. Each relevant fact must be proven
independently; each element of a cause of action must be checked
off in turn. If each and every piece is established, then and only
then may we organize these pieces into a whole that carries social
meaning, determining, for example, that a cause of action has been
established. This thought process is deductive or "systematic"
reasoning.
Another way to ask and answer the question, "did something
happen and what does it mean?"--and one that cognitive
psychologists and sociologists describe as broadly characteristic of
ordinary human cognition in the context of complex social
settings-reverses the systematic approach."
We ask instead
whether an account of an event is plausible and compelling. We do
not separate facts in order to build our house brick by brick. We
instead wade into the spider web of interrelated facts, looking all
around us for the pattern of meaning that knits together a
complex set of connected threads. By this latter approach, one
called "heuristic," we judge the adequacy of an interpretation by
asking, "does the story I am telling about these facts hang
together? Does it persuade?" If we are in the context of a dispute,
we ask, "does the story you are telling me seem more likely than
competing accounts of the same events?"
O'Connor reflects the power of heuristic argument in his
claim that "true lawyers hate facts"; but I believe he overstates the
case. 23
Although facts are the building blocks of systematic
thought and stories the bricks of heuristic thought, these are not
mutually exclusive ways of thinking, "for, by finding the elements,
one may find the underlying structure, and by finding the
underlying structure, one may find the constituent elements." 4
Facts and stories are thus tightly connected in legal
argumentation, so that the accumulation of facts through the
formal offerings of evidence at a trial steadily narrows the
alternative accounts that are able to account for all the relevant
facts.
Studies of jury decisionmaking confirm that this is what
juries do when they must decide legal questions. Notwithstanding
the judge's instructions and the manner of presenting evidence at
trial (which conforms to the orthodox idea of legal truthfinding),
jurors construct episodes based upon the factual evidence they
hear and the judge's instructions, and then search for goodness of
fit between the possible episodes and the possible verdicts. 5
22. See generally Pennington & Hastie, supra note 10, at 51.

23. O'Connor, supra note 2, at 444.
24. Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of JuridicalProof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV.

373, 383 (1991).
25. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 10, at 556; Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex DecisionMaking, 51 J.
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Juries (and, by extension, judges and other triers of fact) thus
determine not only "what happened" as historical fact, but the
frameworks within which events should be understood."
Counsel for Oedipus artfully reveals the process. Nellie
Lynam wants a legal separation on the grounds of cruelty and
adultery from her husband, Tom. 7 The adultery is admitted and
only the issue of cruelty is contested.28 Under direct examination
at the trial, Nellie, a small and soft-spoken woman of exaggerated
respectability, testifies to physical and emotional abuse.29 Tom has
called her names too terrible to repeat, and physically kicked her
out of the house with their five-year-old son as a witness. 0 Her
testimony is compelling, but O'Connor tells us that it was Tom
himself who made Nellie's case by taking the stand, for the errant
husband is a recognizable "type": "He was a big, good-looking man
with a stiff, morose manner; one of those men who are deceptively
quiet and good-humored for months on end and then lay you out
with a stick for a casual remark about politics." 1
So how, then, does Tom's lawyer, Mickie Joe Dougherty,
reframe the meaning of this powerful conjunction of facts (Nellie's
testimony) and stereotype (Tom's "type")? As Mickie Joe crossexamines Nellie, new facts about her behavior towards her
husband, his friends, their children, emerge from the lawyer's
questioning. 2
O'Connor writes, "You couldn't any longer see
[Nellie] the way you had seen her first. Whether it was right or
wrong, another picture was beginning to emerge of a woman who
was both ruthless and designing and who ruled her great brute of
a husband by her weakness.""
Mickie Joe sketches another
stereotype.
In this contest between competing versions of the plausible,
"story" structure is vitally important. Faced with incomplete,
ambiguous, conflicting or complex evidence, juries fill in the gaps,
constructing a coherent episode that follows typical narrative
style, with a beginning, a middle and an end, with all causal

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 244 (1986) [hereinafter Pennington &

Reid, Evidence Evaluation]. See also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Juror
Decision-MakingModels: The GeneralizationGap, 89 PSYCHOL. BULL. 246,
251 (1981).
26. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 170-72 (1999).

27. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 442.
28. Id.

29. Id. at 443-44.
30. Id. at 443.
31. Id. at 442.
32. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 445-49. Nellie, we learn, fails to cook for her
husband, will not go out visiting with him, embarrasses him before his friends,
spoils his children so that they cannot be cared for by others, and has refused
to have sex with him for over two years. Id.
33. Id. at 446.
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relationships specified. Where does the story structure that
organizes these facts come from? It comes from our "frames of
world knowledge,"34 which include not only our own experiences or
simulations of our own behavior in particular settings, but more
importantly secondary sources of cultural knowledge, including
stereotypes. 5
O'Connor thus shows how "smart" stereotypes can make a
lawyer, even one of Mickie Joe's middling abilities, as he states: "It
cannot be pretended that the best day he ever was, Mickie Joe was
much of a lawyer or made a good appearance in court."06 Mickie
Joe knows all he appears to know about Tom and Nellie's marriage
not because he investigated and gained superior knowledge of the
facts. Rather, he has access to a set of stock stories. His
possession of a powerful image of Nellie, Tom and the story of
their union, allows Mickie Joe to "fill in the blanks" with a story
plausible not only to a "woman-hater" (as O'Connor describes
Mickie Joe), but also to a judge with a "mother-fixation."3 7 He fills
in those blanks with startling, prescient, eventually discomfiting,
accuracy.
The irony of the story comes when Tom, sensing that the tide
has turned against Nellie, refuses to abandon her to the judgment
of the law. 8 Tom follows Nellie out of the courtroom and they talk,
after which Tom announces that "Nellie and me are settling this
between us."39 Mickie Joe is incredulous as he sees his legal
victory, just within grasp, being tossed away.4 ° Tom, however,
responds that the law's stories are not the "real story".41 "There's a
pair of us there ....
I [do not] know where you got your
information, but you can go back to the people that told you and
tell them to mind their own
business. I [will not] let you or anyone
4
talk to my wife that way. 2
If stereotypes make lawyers and juries "smart," they may also
make them wrong, unjust, irrational instruments of oppression.
The legitimate fear of storytelling in the legal context is that it can
be, and is often, used to violate or evade conventional legal norms
about relevance, reliability, completeness, prejudicial effect, etc.
Stories are regarded as appealing to intuition and emotion, thus

34. See Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation,supra note 25, at 24243.
35. Id.
36. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 444.
37. Id. at 442. "But Mickie Joe is a 'woman-hater,' the one [sort of] person
who can stand up to a man with a mother fixation." Id. at 446.
38. Id. at 449.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 446.
42. Id. at 449-50.

20001

"A Good Story" and "The Real Story"

operating as a vehicle for "irrational means of persuasion. " '
Although the dangers are varied, what we fear is that good stories
will push out true stories."
Nowhere in law have the stories that we call gender
stereotypes had more power to control interpretation than when
the subject is the male-female sexual relationship. Few projects
have so consistently engaged feminist legal scholars and activists
than decrying, refuting, and resisting both the truth and the
power of these sexual stereotypes. Feminist theorists argue not
only that law making and enforcement are shaped by genderoppressive social imagery, but that law reproduces social
constructs that distort, confine and defame women's sexuality."
Again, Professor Baron reminds us that our awareness of the
risk of stories does not mean we can leave them alone, particularly
when our task is to teach effective lawyering.
People require
stories in order to judge. If Baron is right to describe the project of
legal feminism as trying to tell truer stories about women's lived
experiences, then we have to have some good stories of our own.
II.

FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE

Several years ago I consulted with Chicago attorney, Terence
Flynn, on a breach of promise to marry case.4" The case, Wildey v.
Spring, would become notorious.
In the face of denunciations
from the media, the public and even the legal community, Flynn
won a $178,00049 jury verdict in federal district court ° only to lose

43. For a sensible (and non-polemical) summary of these dangers, see
Twining, supra note 9, at 359.
44. Twining lists various dangers of stories in legal contexts, including:
(i) sneak in irrelevant facts; (ii) sneak in invented or ungrounded facts;
(iii) suggest facts by innuendo; (iv) focus attention on the actor rather
than the act; (v) appeal to hidden prejudices or stereotypes; (vi) tell the
story in emotionally toned language; (vii) tell a story that may win
sympathy for the speaker or the victim but is irrelevant to the

argument; (viii) make use of dubious analogies; and (viii) subvert
lawyers distinctions between fact, law, and disposition and, more
generally, fact and value.
Id. at 359.
45. On successive waves of debate within feminist theory about strategies
for contending with sexual stereotypes (in law and elsewhere), see generally
Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995).
46. Baron, supra note 2, at 159.
47. The case was brought under the 1947 Illinois Breach of Promise Act,
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/1 et. seq. (1993). It was litigated in federal district
court on diversity jurisdiction.
48. Wildey v. Springs, 840 F.Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev'd by Wildey v.
Springs, 47 F.3d 1475 (7th Cir. 1995).
49. 840 F.Supp. at 1261. The district court judge reduced the award to
$118,000, ruling that Wildey could not collect damages for lost business

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:181

at the Seventh Circuit on a dubious procedural ground of notice.5
Attorney Flynn's litigation strategy is evidence that we are
not wed to a fixed set of stories in the law. New stories can
complicate, call into question, and even counter old ones, provided
they create meaning and thus organize the world. At the same
time, as Professor Baron warns, it is not the case that such
alternative accounts counter a stereotype with a view more true to
life. They may, in fact, be only a different set of stereotypes. After
all, to communicate meaningfully, a heuristic image must be fully
resonant in the social world and not stand apart from it." What is
notable about Flynn's strategy was his ability to deploy a new
"stock story" in our culture: woman as survivor.
Illinois statute authorizes an action for breach of promise to
marry, a cause of action long recognized at common law." These
actions have fallen into disuse in recent decades. Many states
abolished similar statutes beginning in the 1930s, labeling them
"heartbalm," conveying the principal criticism that asking for
money damages to remedy romantic and relational loss is a misuse
of the law. 4 The Illinois legislature tried to abrogate its breach of
promise statute," but the state Supreme Court ruled the abolition
unconstitutional under a provision of the state constitution

profits, leaving in place $25,000 in damages for medical expenses and $93,000
for emotional pain and suffering. Id. at 1267-69.
50. The jury consisted of seven men and one woman; they deliberated for
only three hours before reaching their verdict. See Matt O'Connor, He Won
Her Heart and Broke It; She Won Suit and May Break Him, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Nov. 11, 1993, at All (source on file with author).
51. Wildey, 47 F.3d at 1484. The-Illinois statute requires a plaintiff to
provide a defendant with notice of her intent to sue. The required notice must
be written, signed and sent within three months of the date of the breach. It
must contain, among other items, "the date upon which the promise or
agreement to marry was made." 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/4. Failure to
provide the notice bars the claim. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/5. Before hiring an
attorney, Wildey wrote a letter within the requisite time period that included
three of the four items, but failed to state the date of their engagement.
Wildey, 47 F.3d at 1477. The appeals court ruled this omission was "fatal to
her claim." Id. at 1484.
52. "There doesn't seem to be any language in which to talk about women
that doesn't replicate the problems we are trying to talk our way out of."
Baron, supra note 2, at 118.
53. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/1 et. seq.
54. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have either abolished
or curtailed the cause of action. See Jeffrey D. Kobar, Note, Heartbalm
Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1770, 1770-71 nn.5 & 6 (1985).
See also Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "HeartBalm," 33 MICH.
L. REV. 979 (1935).
55. See ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, Sec. 246.1 & 246.2 (1943) (prohibiting the
filing of any pleading in a civil action for, and abolishing the cause of action of,
breach of contract to marry).
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providing a legal remedy for all injuries: 6 "The contract of
marriage has always been known in the law as a contract
involving civil rights just as other contracts involve such rights
and no reason appears why... such rights should not have their
day in court." 7
Sharon Wildey 5 was an attorney and a 50-year old divorced
mother of four children.59 In a whirlwind romance, she became
engaged to Richard Springs, an Oregon rancher. With Springs'
encouragement, Wildey began to make financial decisions in her
business and family in reliance on the pending marriage. After
seven weeks of engagement, however, Springs reconsidered and
abruptly broke off the engagement. Wildey sued. She claimed her
law practice suffered from the decisions she had made in reliance
on Springs' assurances of support. In addition, she sought medical
expenses for extensive psychiatric counseling and damages for
emotional pain and suffering.
Immediately, in both law and life, Wildey was depicted as a
woman, like Nellie Lynam, who sought to control and manipulate
through her weakness. O'Connor's description of Nellie as a
"gentle, insinuating little woman who was being revealed as a
grey, grim, discontented monster with a mania for power," could
have come from the media coverage of the case.6" Wildey was
painted as a chronic loser at romance 6' who exaggerated her
suffering.62 She was described as bent on revenge or derided as a

56. Heck v. Schupp, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946). The state constitution provides:
Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation;
he ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely, and without being
obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly, and
without delay.
ILL. CONST. art. II, sec. 19.
57. Heck, 68 N.E.2d at 466.
58. See Wildey v. Springs, 840 F. Supp. 1259 (1994). Facts about the case
and the parties are taken from the article by Gretchen Reynolds, A Breach of
Promise, CHICAGO MAGAZINE, April 1994, at 63.
59. Reynolds, supra note 58, at 63.
60. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 449.
61. Hardly a news story failed to mention that Wildey was thrice-divorced,
even though Springs also had been divorced.
62. See, e.g., Debra Saunders, What Mends a Broken Heart? Lots of Money,
ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Nov. 19, 1993, at A10. "[Wildey] did concede ... that
after the break-up with Springs, she vacationed in New England, took a cruise
with her family and bought a $125,000 home." Id.
63. Reynolds, supra note 53, at 113. One CHICAGO TRIBUNE headline read:
He Won Her Heart and Broke It; She Won Suit and May Break Him, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Nov. 11, 1993, at All. Barry Schatz, a Chicago lawyer, was quoted
as saying "This was an instance of a an attorney using her knowledge of the
system to get back at someone who had left her .... I believe the breach-of-

promise law was used here as a form of emotional blackmail. And I consider
that extremely offensive." Id.
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gold digger who sought to exploit her hold on a wealthy man in
order to extract money from him.64 Legal and lay commentators
alike suggested that the jury was off-the-wall.65 Others held
Wildey up as an exemplar of "all that is wrong with society".66
Wildey had a history of depression and in years past had
sought psychiatric treatment for a phobia. Following the breakup
with Springs, she sought further counseling for crippling
depression."8 The defense sought to depict her as unstable, crazy,
predisposed to emotional trouble entirely apart from Springs'
behavior, uncontrolled in her needs and the demands she made on
others. In the same way, O'Connor depicts Nellie's chronic back
problem as psychological aggression directed at her husband,
notwithstanding undisputed evidence of her husband's repeated
battering of that aching body.6"
Attorney Flynn had to craft a strategy that acknowledged
these facts and yet interpreted them differently, to save Wildey
from "Nellie-ization." For example, in the pleadings, depositions
or at trial, he never used the familiar legal terms "emotional
injury" or "psychic or mental distress,"7" with their troubled
gendered history.7' Rather, he consistently referred to "psychiatric
64. See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 62, at A10.
Springs testified that he showered Wildey with $24,000 in gifts.
After ... he broke the engagement, [he] offered to let her keep the

$19,000 engagement ring and use $10,000 in his Chicago bank account.
Apparently the gifts and the money weren't enough for Wildey. She
sued on the grounds that after the breakup she was deeply depressed
and had trouble working.
Id.
Such accusations of blackmail are a venerable form of slander with which to
discredit women who seek to hold men sexually accountable in law. See
Larson, Seduction, supra note 17, at 392-96; LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E.
LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 165-66, nn.147 & 176 (1998).
65. A Chicago lawyer is quoted as crediting the verdict to "skillful
performance by Wildey's lawyer" and "what may have been a softhearted
jury." Andrew Gottesman & Matt O'Connor, Jilted Fianc4'sVictory Jolts
Lawyers and Lovers, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 14, 1993, § 2, at p.1. An
editorialist began her column by observing, "You know there is something
wrong with this country when a jury awards.... ." Saunders, supra note 62, at
A10.
66. See, e.g., Letter from Pippin Stein to CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 22, 1993,
at 14, stating that: "The idea that a 50-year old woman can recover $178,000
from her ex-fianc6 of seven weeks is a gross injustice ... and an example of
what is wrong with this society."
67. See Reynolds, supra note 58, at 63.
68. Id.
69. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 447.
70. Terence E. Flynn, Presentation to the Women's Legal Studies Institute
at the Chicago Kent College of Law, (July 23, 1994) [hereinafter Flynn
Presentation].
71. See generally Martha Chamallas & Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers and
the Law of Fright:A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
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injury." He repeatedly walked Wildey through painful parts of her
life: childhood abuse, divorce, adult psychological suffering and
recovery, yet painted her as a survivor and not a victim or
damaged goods. 2 Wildey testified at trial that she had been raised
in an abusive home.73 Pregnant at sixteen, she married the baby's
father and left home, but the marriage lasted only a few months.74
A year later, with one young son, she married again and soon
thereafter gave birth to a second child, a daughter.75 The child was
born with cystic fibrosis and would later die. 8 This second
youthful marriage also ended quickly.77 At age eighteen, with a
young son and a seriously ill daughter, Wildey began college,
finished in two years, and went on to law school. 8
Following graduation, she opened a series of legal clinics that
specialized in representing battered women and children. 9 Wildey
married a fellow law student and had three more children; after
some years, this marriage ended. ° Wildey raised the four children,
supporting them by working as a lawyer, first in Indiana and later
in Chicago.8 Flynn affirmatively demonstrated that Wildey was
an independent woman and able to care for herself and her
children, as she had done for many years before her engagement to
Springs.
Although it may have been tempting to paint Wildey as
helpless and in need of protection, Flynn says he judged that in
the light of our stereotypes about female weakness (see Nellie),
Wildey "would not be seen as having a right to rely on a man
unless she didn't really need to."82 Whatever one may think of
breach of promise as a legal theory, and despite Wildey's ultimate
loss at the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, her attorney
constructed a competing and plausible story that explained all the

The law of torts values physical security and property more highly than
emotional security and human relationships. This apparently genderneutral hierarchy of values has privileged men, as the traditional
owners and managers of property, and has burdened women, to whom
the emotional work of maintaining human relationships has commonly
been assigned. The law has often failed to compensate women for
recurring harms-serious though they may be in the lives of womenfor which there is no precise masculine analogue.
Id. at 814.
72. Flynn Presentation, supra note 70.
73. Reynolds, supra note 58, at 63.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Reynolds, supra note 58, at 63.
79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id.
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facts, hung together, and ultimately persuaded the jury. Thereby,
he saved Wildey from automatic dismissal in the eyes of the law,
and in the eyes of the world.
CONCLUSION

The implications for the teaching of legal skills are two.
Professor Baron demonstrates how literature illuminates the
importance of storytelling in lawyering, and this article supports
her claims with a review of the scientific evidence concerning the
role of stories in jury decisionmaking. Legal persuasion depends
on storytelling and legal skills courses must teach students to
understand and construct narrative. Effective lawyering requires
more however. This article also contends that lawyers must
understand the silent claims that stories make on a listener's prior
knowledge. This includes knowledge about the powerful and often
volatile messages about gender most human stories incorporate.
The lawyer with such insight can understand the ways that
gender may have shaped a client's experiences of injury, but also is
equipped to strategize the specific gender dynamics of
representing those injuries in the courtroom.

